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SI Methods
Subject Information. Subjects were recruited from a large database
maintained by the Human Neuroimaging Laboratory (HNL) at
Baylor College of Medicine (BCM). Most subjects were afﬁliated
with the Texas Medical Center or Rice University in various ways.
Subjects were recruited in pairs and kept separate throughout the
task, so the experiment was completely anonymous. Subjects were
informed that they were playing a real person and seemed to believe
this to be the case.
After ﬁlling out a standard screening form and giving consent,
subjects were given written instructions on the task. After reading
the instructions they were walked through the task again verbally
and asked to answer a few questions about hypothetical bar-
gaining rounds to make sure that they fully understood the task. If
any of these questions was answered incorrectly, the mistake was
explained and another scenario presented.
After both subjects were fully instructed, they were loaded into
the scanner and participated in 60 rounds of the bargaining task.
At the end, they were told their total earnings and given an open-
ended debrieﬁng sheet on which they were asked to describe, in
their own words, how they had approached the task.
Demographics, including age, sex, and socioeconomic status for
all 76 subjects, are provided in Table S1 according to group. In
addition to those three factors we assessed 29 subjects (10 in-
crementalists, 9 conservatives, and 10 strategists) on a standard IQ
test [Cattel’sCulture Fair IQ test, form3a (1)]. Theonly signiﬁcant
demographic effect among groups according to one-way ANOVA
was for age: strategists are signiﬁcantly younger than other sub-
jects. Conservative and strategist IQs were both signiﬁcantly
higher than average, whereas incrementalist IQs were not.
Behavioral Analysis. For each of the 76 buyers in the sample we
classiﬁed behavior according to the last 30 periods of the game.We
focusedon the latter half of theexperimentbecause several subjects
changed strategies signiﬁcantly between the ﬁrst and second halves
of the experiment. Of particular interest, four subjects in this
analysis became strategists behaviorally midway through the ex-
periment. Not only did their behavior shift signiﬁcantly, but also
upon debrieﬁng these subjects explicitly mentioned changing from
Nash behavior (no correlation between suggestion and value) to
strategist behavior (a negative correlation between suggestion and
value). Although this shift in itself is interesting, it occurred in too
few subjects to do systematic analysis (a similar evolution of stra-
tegic sophistication is shown parametrically in ref. 2).We therefore
concentrated on the latter half of the experiment when all subject
behavior had stabilized. Results from the behavioral regressions in
both early and late rounds are shown in Table S2. Note that be-
tween early and late rounds, the slope coefﬁcients [“information
revelation” (IR) values] for both incrementalist and strategists
generally increased in magnitude, and R2 values increase.
Cluster analysis.Weperformeda regressionof buyers’ suggestions on
their private values from the second half of the experiment. This
yielded three descriptive strategy parameters for each buyer:
the slope, intercept, and ﬁt (R2) of the regression. We normalized
these three statistics across subjects by subtracting means and di-
viding by SDs. Clusters were then identiﬁed using the k-means
algorithm (3). We found that cluster assignment only changed for
one subject when intercepts were included (that assignment went
from incrementalist to conservative). Therefore, the results in the
text are clustered using the k-means method on only slope and ﬁt.
Cognitive hierarchymodel.Theclusteranalysiswasabottom-up,data-
driven analysis that did not address how subjects might arrive at
behavior. To complement this analysis, we created a model based
on Camerer et al.’s cognitive hierarchy (CH) model (4) that ad-
dresses player incentives, the structure of the game, and most
importantly posits an algorithm for how individuals might form
beliefs in this game.
In the cognitive hierarchy model (Fig. S1), players perform
different numbers of “steps of thinking” to form beliefs. Zero step
(or “level-0”) thinkers behave naïvely—randomly in the original
formulation—and lack a model of how other players will behave.
Level-1 thinkers assume that they are playing level-0 players and
best respond to naïve behavior. Level-n thinkers think that they
are playing a mixture of players from all of the n-1 levels below
them and best respond to that mixture.
In our model we assume that level-0 buyers have a ﬁxed type,
α, distributed u(0,1). Level-0 buyers will thus send suggestions
according to:
s ¼ min10; max1; ½α vþ ε; ε∼N0; σ2Þ:
Level-0 sellers are assumed to be naïve and respond to a buyer
suggestion s according to:
p ¼ min10; max1; ½sþ ε; ε∼N0; σ2Þ:
Here [x] is the nearest integer function. We add the max/min
operations to account for the fact that both price and suggestion
must be integer valued and between 1 and 10. Let F denote the
cumulative normal distribution function with mean 0 and vari-
ance σ2. Then these assumptions translate to the conditional
distributions:
P0− buyer

s j v; α ¼ Fsþ :5− α v−Fs− :5− α v
for 1 < s < 10;
P0− buyer

1 j v; α ¼ F1:5− αv and P0− buyer10 j v; α
¼ 1−F9:5− αvÞ:
P0− sellerðp j sÞ ¼ Fðpþ :5− sÞ−Fðp− :5− sÞ for 1 < p < 10;
P0− sellerð1 j sÞ ¼ Fð1:5− sÞ and P0− sellerð10 j sÞ ¼ 1−Fð9:5− sÞ:
Intuitively, buyers suggest a price that is a fraction α (<1) of their
value, plus noise. This represents “shaving” bids, a behavior com-
monly observed in auctions of this type (5).
We assume that level-1 buyers respond optimally to level-
0 sellers, with some noise according to the softmax distribution:
P1− buyerðs j vÞ ¼
exp

λπ1− buyer

s; v

∑
s′
exp

λπ1− buyer

s′; v
:
In this expression π1−buyer(v, s) is the expected payoff given value
v and suggestion s if you are a level-1 buyer:
π1− buyerðv; sÞ ¼ ∑
p< v
P0− sellerðp j sÞðv− pÞ:
The level-1 buyer’s probability of sending s is decreasing in v,
with the distribution shifting downward as v increases.
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Level-1 sellers are assumed to also respond optimally to level-
0 buyers. However, they have the extra computational challenge
of updating their prior distributions over the value of α, so their
choice of price depends on the current suggestion and also on
the entire history of suggestions (and on the sensible inference of
how much information about value the suggestions have gener-
ally implied). They respond according to the distribution:
P1− seller

p jst ¼ expðλπ1− sellerðp j fstgÞÞ∑
p′
expðλπ1− sellerðp′ j fstgÞÞ
π1− sellerðp j fstgÞ ¼ p ·P ðv≥ pÞ
¼ p ∑
v≥ p
P0− buyer

v jst:
We ﬁnd the distribution P0− buyerðv; fst Þg in two steps. First we
determine the posterior distribution over α at time t, using
Bayesian updating iteratively:
P

α jst ¼ Pðst j αÞPðα j fst− 1gÞÐ1
0
Pðst j α′ÞP

α′ jst− 1dα′
;
where
P

s j α ¼ ∑10
v¼1
P0− buyer

sjv; αÞ:
We use this posterior over α to ﬁnd a posterior over values:
P0− buyer

v jst ¼
ð1
0
Pðv j α; stÞPðα j fstgÞdα
∑
10
v¼1
ð1
0
Pðv′ j α; stÞPðα j fstgÞdα
;
where
P

v j α; s ¼ P0− buyer

s j v; α
∑
10
v′¼1
P0− buyer

s j v′; α
:
We simpliﬁed these computations by approximating the initial
uniform distribution over α with a discrete distribution whereby α
took the values {0, 0.01, 0.02, . . ., 0.99. 1} with equal probability.
Finally, level-2 buyers respond optimally to a 50/50 mixture of
level-0andlevel-1sellers.Importantly, level-2buyersanticipatehow
their suggestions will change a level-1 seller’s posterior over α and
how these changes will affect payoffs in the next period. (Because
we are assuming limited, hierarchical reasoning throughout, we
only have level-2 sellers project one period into the future rather
than considering theentire experimental run.Weconsider only one
period of forecasting because adding more does not signiﬁcantly
change predicted choices but does become too computationally
taxing to estimate. Time to estimate the level-2 model grows ex-
ponentially with the number or periods ahead considered.) To get
probabilities of buyer’s suggestions we plug expected payoffs given
these beliefs into a softmax function as we did for level-1 buyers
and sellers:
P2− buyer

st j v;

st− 1
 ¼ exp

λπ2− buyer

st j v;

st− 1

∑
s′
exp

λπ2;buyer

s′ j v;st− 1:
Here π2− buyer

st j v;

st− 1
 ¼ Current Payoff
þ Future Payoff where :
Current Payoff ¼ :5

∑
p< v
P1− sellerðp j fstgÞðv− pÞ

þ :5

∑
p< v
P0− sellerðp j stÞðv− pÞ

; and
Future Payoff ¼
∑vtþ1maxstþ1

∑p< vtþ1 ð:5P1− sellerðp j fstþ1gÞ þ :5P0− sellerðp j stþ1ÞÞðv− pÞ

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Predicted behavior for level-1 sellers in period 2 under different
suggestion histories (s = 1 in period 1 vs. s = 2 in period 2) is
shown in Fig. S2 along with predicted level-2 buyer behavior in
period 1. Note that at low values, level-2 buyers will tend to send
high suggestions because this will improve their period 2 ex-
pected payoffs, whereas at high values they send low suggestions
to collect current rewards. Note that this behavior corresponds
to the strategist cluster in the regression-based analysis.
We estimated the maximum likelihoods for level-0, level-1, and
level-2 behavior for each of the 76 buyers in the sample, con-
centrating once again on the second half of the experiment as we
did in the cluster analysis. We found that there were problems
separately attributing noise in the models to the λ and σ pa-
rameters (i.e., identifying parameters), so we ﬁxed σ = 2. Be-
cause each of the models then has only one free parameter—α
for level-0, λ for levels 1 and 2—we compared the three like-
lihoods directly to classify each buyer as level 1, 2, or 3. Pa-
rameters were optimized over the following ranges: α in [0, 1], λ
in [0.5, 8]. Table S3 summarizes these results. Log likelihoods
were not reported if they did worse than random (log likelihood
of −69). Two subjects, AQ-1 and DY-1, were not classiﬁed as
level 0, 1, or 2 because the random model does better than all
three. Fourteen of the 16 strategists in our sample were classiﬁed
as level 2. The remaining strategists were classiﬁed as level 1. All
incrementalists were classiﬁed as level 0; however, the CH model
tended to classify conservatives as level 0 players with low αs
rather than as level 1.
Functional MRI Analysis. Other activations of interest. In addition to
the results shown in the main text, there were several other
activations of interest that were suggestive but did not pass any
correction for multiple comparisons. There was a signiﬁcant
activation in the right retrosplenial cortex when we regressed
activity at decision time on IR. Activation and time courses
separated by behavioral type are shown in Fig. S3A. Although the
activation was detected at the time of decision, time course
analysis reveals that the differences in activation begin at trial
onset and continue through the postdecision epoch. Although
the functions of this area are less well understood than those of
the areas highlighted in the main text, we believe that this acti-
vation is indicative of the prospective thinking involved in
strategist thinking (6–8).
Incrementalists showed decreased activation in the right cau-
date compared with the other two groups (boxcar over trial; Fig.
S3B). This area has been linked to perceptions of reward, par-
ticularly when those rewards are seen as the result of speciﬁc
actions (9). Decreased activity in this area in the incrementalists
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may reﬂect their relatively passive, honest strategy. In addition,
analysis of the region of interest (ROI) reveals that only strate-
gists show consistent modulation of caudate activity by value.
We performed an additional set of analyses using R2 as the
between-subject regressor and found two activations of interest.
First, we found that bilateral posterior insula correlated positively
with R2 at trial onset (Fig. S4A). Second, we found a signiﬁcant
negative interaction between suggested price and R2 in the left
posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS). ROI analysis of the latter
activation indicated that this activation was driven by a negative
correlation between activity and suggested price in the in-
crementalists that was largely absent in the other two groups. Ex-
amination of the time series showed that incrementalists seemed to
have a secondary activation in the area at decision after sending
low, but not high, suggestions (Fig. S4B).
In all of the analyses, the strategists drove most of the acti-
vations. We found very few areas where activity was actually
higher for the incrementalists or conservatives. Two such acti-
vations in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and middle
paracingulate at decision ended up actually being the timing
artifacts of larger activations extending over the trial, and acti-
vation peaks did not prove to be signiﬁcantly different (Fig. S5).
The interpretation of this activation as a timing artifact is sup-
ported by the facts that incrementalists have somewhat longer
response times and that although the activation in question be-
gins at trial onset and persists through the trial, no between-
subject differences are found using the boxcar regressions that
account for these differences in response times. These areas are
also apparent in the analysis using R2 as a between-subject re-
gressor at decision (Table S4b; clusters of interest are italicized).
The absence of between-group differences in these areas is no-
table given Coricelli and Nagel’s ﬁndings that medial prefrontal
cortex activity correlates with depth of reasoning in the p-beauty
contest (10).
Activation Tables. Activations from the relevant between-subjects
contrasts on the main effects are shown in Table S4 a–c. Relevant
interactions are shown in Table S4d. Cluster corrections are
shown at P < 0.001 (uncorrected) and cluster size (k) at least 5.
Between-group t tests and regression on IR often showed very
similar areas of activation, and all three of the areas discussed in
the main text were signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level in both analyses.
Areas discussed in the main text are highlighted in bold; areas
highlighted in the supporting information are italicized.
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Fig. S1. Cognitive hierarchy model. In the model, level-0 players are assumed to be naïve. In this case, naïve buyers use a simple linear suggestion strategy,
and level-0 sellers are credulous. Level-n players believe that they are playing a lower-level player. Thus, a level-1 player believes that she is playing a naïve
level-0 player with certainty. On the other hand, a level-2 player has a prior distribution over opponent type (level-0 or level-1) and best responds given this
prior distribution.
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Fig. S2. Model predictions. (A) Predicted level-1 seller behavior in period 2 given different suggestions in period 1. On the left, note that when the period 1
suggestion is 1, level-1 sellers will be relatively insensitive to low suggestions, choosing an average price of 5 given a suggestion of 1. However, when the
suggestion in period 1 is 10, sellers are far more likely to respond to a low suggestion with a low price (behavior shown on the right). (B) Predicted level-2 buyer
behavior in period 1. Given the behavior shown in A, level-2 buyers are likely to choose a high (>5) suggestion in period 1 if their value is low, to increase
possible future payments.
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Fig. S3. Other activations of interest. (A) Strategists differentially activate the retrosplenial cortex at the moment of deception. Regression of neural activity
at decision on information revelation. Left: Retrosplenial activation at decision time. Peak voxels at (8, −56, 8) and (8, −40, 0), k = 21, cluster-level P = 0.088
(corrected). Center: Time courses in retrosplenial cortex by group. Right: Scatter plot of general linear model coefﬁcients vs. IR. (B) Activity along the right
caudate over entire trial. Right caudate was found to be less active on average in incrementalists than in conservatives or strategists when using the boxcar
regressor. Cluster shown here (Left) is thresholded at P < 0.002; activation remains at P < 0.001. Examination of the time series broken down by the buyer’s
value (Right) shows that not only is overall activity increased in the conservative and strategist groups, but only the strategists show consistent modulation of
activity by value.
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Fig. S4. Activations correlated to R2. (A) Bilateral posterior insula activity correlates with R2 at trial onset. Examination of the time series (Right) indicates that
this may be driven by a deactivation in the area in conservatives. Average decision times for each of the three groups are shown by dashed lines. (B) Activity in
left posterior STS at decision time correlates negatively with the interaction between R2 and suggested price. The time series analysis (Right) indicates that this
is caused by a secondary activation in incrementalists in the area after they send a low suggestion, which is absent when they send high suggestions. Strategists
show no difference in STS activity based on choice, and conservatives show insufﬁcient variance in suggestions to ﬁnd any relationship. Activations are both
shown at P < 0.001, uncorrected. Full statistics are in Table S4.
Fig. S5. There was an apparent incrementalist activation of the dorsal ACC and middle paracingulate at subject decision time; however, examination of the
time courses shows that this may be driven by slight differences in the timing of an activation at trial onset between groups. Speciﬁcally, activity in the area
seems to peak slightly earlier for strategists, manifesting as a difference in activation at decision. There were no signiﬁcant differences among the peaks of
these activations.
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